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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. WHETHER THE MARSHALL APPELLATE COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT PETITIONER, LAWRENCE A. WILSON d/b/a SENTRY SERVICES, VIOLATED MR.
SLATER'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY BY INTRUDING INTO
HIS SECLUSION THROUGH IMPOSITION OF A BLOOD
TEST FOR THE AIDS ANTIBODY WITHOUT NOTICE OR
CONSENT.
II. WHETHER THE MARSHALL APPELLATE COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT PETITIONER VIOLATED MR.
SLATER'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY BY INDISCRIMINATELY
PUBLICIZING HIS PRIVATE MEDICAL INFORMATION
TO UNRELATED THIRD PARTIES WHO HAD NO LEGITIMATE NEED FOR THIS INFORMATION.
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OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of Judge Helms of the Lincoln County District
Court granting Petitioner's motion for summary judgment on both
counts of the Complaint is unreported.
The unanimous opinion of the Marshall Appellate Court for the
First Judicial Circuit reversing the decision of the District Court
and ordering the District Court to enter summary judgment in favor
of Respondent on the issue of liability and further ordering that
trial be held on the issue of damages is also unreported. This opinion is set forth at pp. 1-7 of the Record and is reproduced in Appendix A.
JURISDICTION
A formal statement of jurisdiction is omitted pursuant to Rule
III(F) of the Rules of the 1987 John Marshall (Benton) National
Moot Court Competition in Information Law and Privacy.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND RULES INVOLVED
Although there are no constitutional provisions directly involved with this action, the following constitutional provision is indirectly discussed and is set forth in Appendix C: U.S. Const.
amend. I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In April, 1987, without his knowledge or consent, Respondent,
John Slater [hereinafter "Mr. Slater"] was subjected to a Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Test [hereinafter "HIV test"] by his employer Lawrence Wilson d/b/a Sentry Services [hereinafter "Petitioner" or "Sentry"] (R. 2). Petitioner's application of this test and
the subsequent publication of its positive results constitute the gravamen of Mr. Slater's complaint (R. 3).
Mr. Slater initiated this action on June 12, 1987 alleging that
Petitioner had intruded into his seclusion by subjecting his blood
sample to an Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome [hereinafter
"AIDS"] antibody test without his consent (R. 1, 3). He further alleged that Petitioner had violated his expectation of privacy by disclosing confidential medical information to unrelated third parties
in the business community (R. 1, 3).
Both parties filed cross motions for summary judgment (R. 1,
3). In support of his Motion, Mr. Slater submitted a copy of the
Recommendation for Preventing Transmission of Infection with
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Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III/Lymphadenopathy-Associate Virus in the Workplace [hereinafter "CDC Report"] (See Appendix E), prepared by the Center for Disease Control (R. 3). Petitioner submitted no evidence to contravene the report (R. 3-4).
The trial court granted Petitioner's motion for summary judgment on both counts (R. 1). The Marshall Appellate Court for the
First Judicial Circuit [hereinafter "Marshall Appellate Court"] reversed the trial court on both counts (R. 7). The appellate court directed the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of Mr.
Slater on the issue of liability, and ordered a trial on the issue of
damages (R. 7).
On July 17, 1987, this court granted Petitioner leave to appeal,
ordering the parties to address all issues raised in the opinion of the
Marshall Appellate Court (order dated July 17, 1987, reproduced in
Appendix B).
Mr. Slater was hired by Sentry in 1983 and subsequently left
Petitioner's employ on April 30, 1987 to complete his education and
pursue employment related to his degree (R. 1, 3). Sentry provides
private security guard services in four counties in the State of Marshall. It is operated as a sole proprietorship by Petitioner (R. 1).
Sentry provides an annual physical examination program for its
employees that includes a blood test (R. 2). In examinations prior to
the incident in question, employees' blood had only been tested for
cholesterol and hypoglycemia (R. 2). Employees were always informed of the targeted information of the blood tests (R. 2). Any
employee who tested positive for a cardiovascular or blood-sugar
disorder was given a leave of absence until the company physician
approved the employee's return to work (R. 2). Petitioner recorded
test results in its employee personnel files and regarded this medical
information as confidential (R. 2). Mr. Slater never objected to this
physical examination procedure (R. 2).
A dramatic change in the established procedures began in December 1986. At that time the Lincoln Medical Laboratory, retained
by Petitioner for purposes of its physical examination program, suggested that Petitioner include an HIV test in the April, 1987 series
of tests (R. 2). This test determines the existence of AIDS antibodies within a person's system, but is not a test for the disease (R. 2,
N. 1). Petitioner included the HIV test in Sentry's testing procedure
in April 1987 without informing its employees (R. 2). Mr. Slater surrendered a blood sample without notice or knowledge of the additional test, and with prior understanding that all test results would
be kept confidential (R. 2).
The day after Mr. Slater left his employment with Sentry, May
1, 1987, Petitioner learned that Mr. Slater had tested positive for
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the AIDS antibody (R. 3). Petitioner then contacted Mr. Slater and
informed him of this finding (R. 3).
On May 6, 1987, Petitioner attended a monthly luncheon of the
Lincoln County Chamber of Commerce (R. 3). The luncheon was
attended by more than seventy-five area businessmen (R. Appendix
1). During lunch, prior to the start of a business meeting, Petitioner
informed his business colleagues that his company had tested employees for the AIDS antibody, and that one had tested positive (R.
3). Petitioner went on to breach his company's policy of confidentiality by naming Mr. Slater as the employee who tested positive to
the HIV test (R. 3).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State of Marshall recognizes a cause of action for invasion
of privacy through an intrusion into seclusion, and also provides recovery for publicity given to private facts. Mr. Slater is a private
figure. His blood and the information contained therein are private
matters. Petitioner violated Mr. Slater's right to be left alone by intruding upon his seclusion and by giving publicity to purely private
medical information.
Petitioner intruded upon Mr. Slater's seclusion by disguising an
unwarranted AIDS antibody investigation as a seemingly routine
physical examination. Petitioner failed to notify Mr. Slater or obtain
his consent before subjecting him to this unnecessary and highly offensive procedure.
Petitioner neither suspected that Mr. Slater had been exposed
to the AIDS virus, nor had any reason to believe that he posed a
health risk to other company employees. Petitioner lacked any bona
fide occupational interest in requiring his employees to undergo
such a degrading and invasive examination.
Petitioner aggravated this injury by giving unwarranted publicity to the information obtained. Petitioner indiscriminately disclosed Mr. Slater's positive test results at a Chamber of Commerce
luncheon to individuals who had no need for the information. In so
doing, Petitioner breached his long standing company policy that all
employee medical records would remain private.
The publicity given to Mr. Slater's HIV test results constituted
an invasion of his right to privacy. The businessmen present during
the luncheon were sufficient in number to insure publicity of the
private facts. The personal nature of the information released to unrelated third parties in the business community was highly prejudicial to Mr. Slater, and exceedingly offensive to the reasonable person. No legitimate public concern required Petitioner to publicize
such personal information about a former employee who posed no
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threat to the community.
Petitioner's highly offensive disclosure of Mr. Slater's private
physiology failed to advance any legitimate interest of the Petitioner, the businessmen to whom it was publicized, or the public at
large. Petitioner's offensive action conferred a benefit upon no one,
but caused Mr. Slater irreparable injury.
Additionally, Petitioner can not shield himself with conditional
privileges, because the only party with an established interest in the
information was Mr. Slater. The appellate court correctly refused to
confer a privilege to Petitioner because of his blatant release of Mr.
Slater's name along with his medical information. The appellate
court correctly found that Petitioner abused any narrow privilege
exception, and determined that Mr. Slater was entitled to recovery
as a matter of law for his irreparable injuries. Petitioner abused any
purported privilege he may have had. The decision below must be
affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE APPELLATE COURT PROPERLY, HELD THAT THE
COMPULSORY BLOOD TEST FOR THE AIDS ANTIBODY
INITIATED BY PETITIONER, WITHOUT GIVING NOTICE
TO OR OBTAINING THE CONSENT OF MR. SLATER,
CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION OF MR. SLATER'S RIGHT
OF PRIVACY BY INTRUDING INTO HIS SECLUSION.

Petitioner initiated a blood testing procedure that was imposed
upon Mr. Slater without his knowledge or consent. The Marshall
Appellate Court held, as a matter of law, that Petitioner's appropriation of the information from the HIV test was a violation of Mr.
Slater's privacy interests because it intruded into his seclusion. The
court correctly determined that when the evidence is viewed in a
light most favorable to Petitioner, Mr. Slater's privacy interests outweighed any legitimate interest Petitioner may have had. Based
upon the undisputed facts and uncontroverted evidence, Mr. Slater
is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
The United States Supreme Court first recognized a right of
privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). This right
of privacy has been described as "the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized man." Stanley v. Georgia,394
U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The Court has described
the privacy right as one of those fundamental rights that are "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' such that 'neither liberty nor
justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed.'" Bowers v.Hardwick,
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106 S. Ct. 2841, 2844 (1986) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325-26 (1937)).
In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977), the Court recognized that the right of privacy encompasses at least two different
kinds of interests, "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters, and . . .the interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions."
These landmark decisions establish the constitutional magnitude of the right of privacy. The protections afforded by this right,
to be free from unwarranted intrusions and from disclosures of personal matters, have been abridged in this action.
The fundamental right of privacy can be effectively protected
without the necessity of constitutional scrutiny. The common law
provides for an effective tort remedy through an intrusion into seclusion claim. The same policies that underlie the interests protected by the constitutional right of privacy are applicable to privacy at common law and the intrusion into seclusion interests
embodied within this right.
A.

THE STATE OF MARSHALL RECOGNIZES THE TORT OF
INVASION OF PRIVACY AND PROTECTS AGAINST
SUCH UNWARRANTED AND OFFENSIVE INTRUSIONS
INTO SECLUSION AS THOSE IMPOSED UPON MR.
SLATER.

The State of Marshall has joined the majority of jurisdictions
that recognize the Restatement (Second) of Torts common law right
of privacy (R. 4). Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A (1977). The
origin of this right, which was not expressly recognized at early common law, can be directly traced to an 1890 article which reviewed a
number of English and American cases purporting to have protected
the right of privacy or what was called the right to be "let alone."
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193
(1890). By 1966, scholars recognized the importance of this tort as a
cause of action at common law. Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were
Warren and Brandeis Wrong? 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 326
(1966).
Marshall courts have adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts §
652B providing that:
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Liability under this section attaches when a person "has intruded
into a private place, or has otherwise invaded a private seclusion
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that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or affairs." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B comment c (1977). The Restatement
additionally requires that "the interference with the plaintiff's seclusion be a substantial one, of a kind that would be highly offensive to
the ordinary reasonable man, as the result of conduct to which the
reasonable man would strongly object." Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 652B comment d (1977).
The unwarranted appropriation of Mr. Slater's blood for additional testing was a substantial intrusion into Mr. Slater's seclusion
that would offend a reasonable person. The Michigan Supreme
Court acknowledged the concept of the right of privacy and the liability that attaches thereto in the landmark case of De May v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881). In that case, Mrs. Roberts
gave birth in her home and the attending physician allowed a young
man, who had accompanied him to carry his bags, to remain in the
room during the delivery. In affirming a verdict in favor of Mrs.
Roberts based on an invasion of privacy, the court held that:
It would be shocking to our sense of right, justice and propriety to
doubt even but that for such an act the law would afford an ample
remedy. To the plaintiff the occasion was a most sacred one and no
one had a right to intrude unless invited or because of some real and
pressing necessity .... The plaintiff had a legal right to the privacy
of her apartment at such a time, and the law secures to her this right
by requiring others to observe it...
De May, 9 N.W. at 165-66.
Petitioner's actions in the present case are equally, if not more,
"shocking" and offensive. Mr. Slater was confronted with a bodily
intrusion of the kind which is physically offensive. A reasonable person would find this intrusion to be highly offensive. The offensiveness lies in the fact that Mr. Slater believed he was being tested for
hypoglycemia and cholesterol, when in fact he was also being tested
for the AIDS antibody. Such intrusions are violative of the secret
and secluded areas Mr. Slater has a right to keep private. Nelson v.
Maine Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1223 (Me. 1977).
B.

MR. SLATER'S SECLUSION WAS INTRUDED UPON
WHEN PETITIONER ENTERED INTO HIS PRIVATE
PHYSIOLOGICAL BIOGRAPHY, AN AREA IN WHICH MR.
SLATER HAD A REASONABLE EXPECTATION TO BE
LEFT ALONE.

The United States Supreme Court has specifically recognized
"blood" and "bodily fluids" as areas entitled to privacy protection.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). In McDonell v.
Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985), aff'd 809 F.2d
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1302 (8th Cir. 1987), the court held that intrusions authorized by a
Department of Corrections' policy which subjected employees to
urinalysis and blood tests upon request of the Department officials,
constituted intrusions into areas in which employees had a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy. The underlying rationale
is that "[olne's anatomy is draped with constitutional protection."
United States v. Afanador, 567 F.2d 1325, 1331 (5th Cir. 1978). Accordingly, the Marshall Appellate Court correctly found that "the
physiological biography contained in the blood of an individual is
private information which an individual can reasonably expect to be
left alone . . ., [and that] Slater's private physiological biography is
a matter entitled to seclusion . . ." (R. 5).
A majority of jurisdictions have considered four factors in determining whether an intrusion into the solitude or seclusion of another has occurred. First, liability for an invasion of privacy occurs
when there is an intrusion upon private, intimate affairs and the intrusion is one to which an ordinary man would reasonably expect to
be left alone. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960).
The common thread of this recognized factor for an intrusion
into seclusion action is whether the intrusion was reasonable. "Unwarranted" intrusion is actionable when it is highly offensive to a
"reasonable" person. Gill v. Snow, 644 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Ct. App.
1982). Where such an invasion takes place the validity of the findings are irrelevant. A claim exists regardless of whether the information is ultimately published. The invasion, in and of itself, merits
relief.
In Harkey v. Abate, 131 Mich. App. 177, 179, 346 N.W.2d 74, 76
(1983), the court held that the installation of a hidden viewing device in a ladies room constituted a sufficient wrongful intrusion into
the seclusion or solitude of plaintiff and her daughter. The court
reversed a summary judgment to defendant despite the absence of
proof that the device had been utilized. Petitioner's intrusion
through the egregious application of the HIV test presents an even
stronger argument in support of Mr. Slater.
Second, a cause of action may also be sustained in privacy without proof of any physical contact or violation. Hall v. Citizens Ins.
Co. of Am., 141 Mich. App. 676, 368 N.W.2d 250 (1985); see also
Prosser & Keeton, Torts § 117 (5th ed. 1984). Similar to reasoning
under the Fourth Amendment, the tort is intended to protect people, not places. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Jurisdictions generally recognize that what a person seeks to preserve as private, even an area accessible to the public such as a fitting room, is
entitled to protection. See, e.g., Lewis v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 128
Mich. App. 165, 339 N.W.2d 857 (1983). Mr. Slater's physiology is
such a protected area considering the intimacy of one's blood and
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bodily fluids. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Here,
unlike the potential invasion in Lewis, there has been an actual
physical contact.
Third, the content of what an intruder learns by means of an
intrusion is not necessarily controlling when fixing liability. In Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 705 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947
(1969), the court held that "[a]n eavesdropper to the marital bedroom may hear marital intimacies, or he may hear statements of fact
or opinions of legitimate interest to the public; for purposes of liability that should make no difference." AIDS may be of legitimate interest to the public, however, the manner by which Petitioner obtained his information remains reprehensible.
Finally, there is general agreement that unlike other invasions
of privacy, intrusion does not require publicity of the information
obtained. In Hall v. Post, 85 N.C. App. 610, 355 S.W.2d 819 (1987),
the court held that intrusion into seclusion "does not depend upon
any publicity given a plaintiff or his affairs but generally consists of
an intentional physical or sensory interference with, or prying into, a
person's solitude or seclusion or his private affairs." Id. at 823. Accord Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
Mr. Slater is entitled to relief upon establishing that Petitioner
invaded a defined area or place which is protected from physical intrusion. Nelson v. Maine Times, 373 A.2d 1221 (Me. 1977). The undisputed facts in this action establish that Petitioner has initiated
an investigation or examination into Mr. Slater's private concerns.
The Marshall Appellate Court correctly relied on these undisputed
facts in granting summary judgment to Mr. Slater.
C.

THE HIGHLY OFFENSIVE NATURE OF PETITIONER'S
ADMINISTRATION OF THE HIV TEST WAS ESTABLISHED AND HEIGHTENED BY THE ABSENCE OF
KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT.

Petitioner's compulsory blood test was an offensive intrusion
not simply because it involved a bodily violation, but also because
Mr. Slater did not consent. Petitioner lacked any bona fide occupational reason to justify the administration of the test. Such an intrusion into Mr. Slater's private affairs constitutes an invasion of privacy which is highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Mr. Slater was subjected to an HIV test of which he had no
prior knowledge and to which he did not consent. Blood tests are, by
their very nature, intrusive and, absent consent, highly offensive.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Such an invasion into
Mr. Slater's physiological biology, without his consent, must be regarded as a highly offensive intrusion upon his seclusion. In deter-
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mining this issue, the Marshall Appellate Court correctly held that
the non-consensual intentional blood test for the AIDS antibody was
an intrusion. This result, as found by the appellate court, is compelled "[elven if the employer had an interest in determining
whether its employees had been exposed to the AIDS antibody, its
interests are not so great as to justify its administration of such tests
without notice or consent." (R. 5).
Consent is a key element in determining whether intrusions are
highly offensive to a reasonable person. McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F.
Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985), aff'd, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987). If
consent were not a vital element, Mr. Slater's privacy rights would
be subject to the whims of those with power over him or who are in
a position to invade his privacy. Tests administered in Petitioner's
fashion cannot be condoned, even though AIDS is a serious national
problem.
An assertion that Mr. Slater impliedly consented to the administration of the blood test is devoid of merit. Mr. Slater consented to
the administration of the blood test with the knowledge and understanding that the test's scope would remain fixed as in prior years.
Petitioner must not be permitted to arbitrarily and unilaterally expand the scope of his annual blood test to embark on unwarranted
surveillance of his employees.
In Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971), the
court held that an actionable intrusion existed where the press
gained entrance by subterfuge to the home of an accused, photographed him there, and published the photographs without his consent. In determining that the defendant could not be insulated from
liability, the court held that, "clandestine photography of the plaintiff in his den and the recordation and transmission of his conversation without his consent resulting in his emotional distress warrants
recovery for invasion of privacy . . ." Id. at 248. See also Barber v.
Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 1202, 159 S.W.2d 291, 295-96 (1942) (the
right of privacy must include the right to have information kept
from publication unless there is consent). Mr. Slater is entitled to
similar protection from Petitioner's clandestine blood test.
Petitioner took blood samples from employees, leaving them
with a false sense of security. Once Petitioner gained entry into the
employee's privacy he exceeded the original scope of the test and
became intrusive.
Mr. Slater's failure to object to the initial blood test, does not
constitute a blanket waiver of any future blood tests. "Advance consent to future unreasonable searches is not a reasonable condition of
employment." McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. at 1131 (emphasis
in original). Petitioner must not be provided carte blanche to in-
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trude into the physiology of Mr. Slater's bodily fluids without his
express knowledge or consent. The Marshall Appellate Court correctly held that Petitioner's additional test for the AIDS antibody
constituted an intrusion into Mr. Slater's private affairs.
D. PETITIONER LACKED ANY LEGITIMATE BUSINESS INTEREST FOR IMPOSING AN HIV TEST BECAUSE THE
TEST DOES NOT DETERMINE IF A PERSON HAS AIDS,
AIDS CANNOT BE TRANSMITTED THROUGH CASUAL
WORKPLACE CONDUCT, AND THE TEST CAN NOT
MEASURE IMPAIRMENT.
The HIV test is a series of three blood tests designed to detect
the presence of HTLV-III/LAV antibodies that develop in a person's blood. Public Health Service Guidelines for Counseling and
Antibody Testing to Prevent HIV Infection and Aids, 36 Morbidity
& Mortality Weekly Rep. 509 (1987) [hereinafter "Guidelines"] (See
Appendix F); see also Clifford & Iuculano, AIDS and Insurance:
The Rationale for AIDS-Related Testing, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1806,
1812 n. 35 (1987). No commercially available blood test currently
exists to identify the presence of the AIDS virus. See Schatz, The
AIDS Insurance Crisis: Underwriting or Overreaching?, 100 Harv.
L. Rev. 1782 (1987).
The presence of HTLV-III antibodies does not necessarily indicate active infection, nor does it indicate whether a person has or
will contract AIDS. Weiss, Goedert, Sarngadharan, Bodner, Gallo &
Blattner, Screening Test for HTL V-III (AIDS Agent) Antibodies,
1986 J. A.M.A. 262. (See Appendix G). Clinical evidence demonstrates that a person with a positive test result may be immune from
the effects of the AIDS virus, be only a carrier of the virus, develop
AIDS in the indefinite future, or simply be reacting to something
other than the AIDS virus ("a false positive"). McCray, Occupational Risk, of the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Among
Health Care Workers, 314 New Eng. J. Med. 1127 (1986) (See Appendix H).
The inability of Petitioner to determine which employees are
likely to be infected or who, among his employ, practice "high-risk
behaviors," is strong evidence that Petitioner has no valid reason to
administer the HIV test based on a policy of reducing further
spread of infection. See Guidelines at 510. Routine screening for the
HTLV-III/LAV antibody is impractical due to (1) the inability of an
employer to determine which of his employees have been exposed to
the virus and (2) the general lack of risk in connection with the employment of individuals with AIDS. Guidelines at 511; Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius, AIDS in the Workplace: A Medical-Legal Over-
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view, 1986 AIDS L. Litigation Rep. 279 [hereinafter "Morgan"].
Petitioner's actions in the instant case are particularly troubling
because of the considerable widespread fear of AIDS or what has
been termed "AIDSphobia." Kandel, AIDS in the Workplace, 11
Employee Rel. L. J. 678, 686 (1986). The effects of widespread fear
of "contagious" diseases was discussed in School Bd. of Nassau
County v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987). Arline was litigated under
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and held that a person afflicted with
the contagious disease of tuberculosis may be a "handicapped individual" within the meaning of the Act. Citing the legislative history,
the Court noted that Congress had acknowledged society's myths
and fears about diseases and that their myths and fears were as
"handicapping" as the physical limitations resulting from the disease itself. Id. at 1129 n. 11.
Few aspects of a handicap give rise to the same level of a public fear
and misapprehension as contagiousness. Even those who suffer or
have recovered from such noninfectious diseases as epilepsy or cancer
have feared discrimination based on the irrational fear that they
might be contagious.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Even though AIDS was not at issue before the Court in Arline,
the same "irrational fear" of contagion exists. Indeed, the American
Medical Association in its Amicus Curiae Brief to the Court in Arline emphasizes and warns that employment decisions-about persons
infected with the AIDS virus, like decisions about any communicable disease, should be based on reasonable medical judgments and
the potential risk to others. A.M.A. Amicus Curiae Brief in Support
of Petitioners, School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 107 S. Ct.
1123 (1987), reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 135, at D1-D9
(July 15, 1986). Petitioner's fears and concerns must give way to the
privacy interests that are encroached upon by his actions. Petitioner
is duty bound to objectively evaluate the issue of testing for the
AIDS antibody according to the evidence gathered and not be influenced by unsubstantiated and irrational fears of others.
Petitioner's unjustified and arbitrary administration of the HIV
test to Mr. Slater's blood sample lacked a legitimate occupational
interest. There is overwhelming agreement in the medical community that AIDS cannot be transmitted through casual workplace
contact. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Infection with Human T-Lymphotrophic Virus Type III/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus in the Workplace, 34 Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Rep. 682 (1985) [hereinafter "CDC Report"]. Legal
authorities have been persuaded by this learned body of evidence. In
LaRocca v. Dalsheim, 120 Misc. 2d 697, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct.
1983), the court held that AIDS cannot be transmitted by casual
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contact. More recently, in District 27 Community School Bd. v. Bd.
of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1986), the
court agreed with the Commissioner of Health that children with
AIDS should not be excused from regular classrooms based on the
lack of transmissibility of the disease via casual contact. The court
based its decision on clinical evidence and medical data concluding
that:
Reinforced by the total absence of documented cases of HTLVIII/LAV having been transmitted in any way other than by sexual intercourse, by injection of contaminated blood products, including needle sharing, or by an infected mother to her child before or during
birth, the experts unanimously agree that the virus is not transmitted
by casual interpersonal contact or airborne spread, such as breathing,
sneezing, coughing, shaking hands or hugging. After almost five years
of experience, the surveillance data ... forwarded to the CDC, as well
as epidemiologic studies . . . speak strongly against transmission of

AIDS through casual (non-sexual) contact.

Id. at 403 (footnote omitted). Accord Friedland, Saltzman, Rogers,
Kahl, Lesser, Mayers & Klein, Lack of Transmission of HTL V-III!
LAV Infection to Household Contacts of Patients with AIDS or
AIDS-Related Complex with Oral Candidiasis, 314 New Eng. J.
Med. 344 (1986) (See Appendix I); Sande, Transmission of AIDS:
The Case against Casual Contagion, 314 New Eng. J. Med. 380
(1986) (See Appendix J). These reports indicate that despite the
common sharing of objects which contact the human body, AIDS or
ARC can not be casually transmitted. See also Hammett, AIDS and
the Law Enforcement Officer: Concerns and Policy Responses, 1987
Issues & Practices in Crim. Justice 49.
A CDC panel representing business, industry, labor and the
medical community issued guidelines on November 15, 1987. CDC
Report. These guidelines were primarily directed toward health care,
but the Panel made clear that they were equally applicable to employment concerns. CDC Report at 681. The guidelines establish
that routine screening of employees for the AIDS antibody is unnecessary and unwarranted. This conclusion is amply supported by the
finding that, "[rioutine serologic testing of FSWs [Food Service
Workers] for antibody to HTLV-III/LAV is not recommended to
prevent disease transmission for FSWs to consumers." CDC Report
at 694. As a consequence, even "[wiorkers known to be infected with
HTLV-LLL/LAV should not be restricted from work solely based
on this finding. Moreover, they should not be restricted from using
telephones, office equipment, toilets, eating facilities, and water
fountains." CDC Report at 694.
This report is highly relevant and is undisputed in this case (R.
3-4). It establishes, beyond any reasonable doubt, that the compulsory and nonconsensual HIV test imposed upon Mr. Slater served
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no legitimate business interest.
The findings of the CDC and similar reports have provided the
foundation for state legislation in a number of jurisdictions. California, Texas, Massachusetts and Wisconsin have recently enacted legislation prohibiting employers from requiring employees or job applicants to be tested for exposure to the AIDS antibody. (See
Appendix K). Many of these statutes impose a penalty upon employers who administer such a test as a condition of beginning or
maintaining employment. Virtually all such legislation, at a minimum, requires the written consent of the subject prior to imposition
of any test procedures.
Petitioner lacked a reasonably justifiable belief that Mr. Slater
posed a threat to Petitioner's business interests or to other employees. Lacking such a belief, the HIV test was not reasonably related
to any legitimate business interest Petitioner may have had. Such a
relationship is essential. The Texas Supreme Court has noted that,
"polygraph tests are not sanctioned if they are unrelated to the employee's duties or if they are otherwise clearly unreasonable." Talent
v. City of Abilene, 508 S.W.2d 592, 596 (Tex. 1974). The HIV test
was not reasonably grounded in a determination that Mr. Slater's
performance would be affected by the presence of the AIDS antibody. As a result, Petitioner's HIV test was not specifically, directly and narrowly related to Mr. Slater's official duties.
Unlike blood-alcohol testing, an HIV test does not in any way
measure whether a person is impaired due to AIDS. Guidelines at
514. Nor can an HIV test determine whether a person has been exposed to the AIDS virus or even if a person exposed will develop
AIDS. Guidelines at 509. It merely indicates one fact-that an identifiable antibody is present in a person's system. Consequently, Petitioner had no justification to administer an HIV test. There was no
factual basis for believing that Mr. Slater would be unable to satisfactorily perform the duties of his job without affecting his safety or
the welfare of other employees.
The court in McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp.
1122, 1130 (S.D.
Iowa 1985), aff'd, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987) stated:
Taking and testing body fluid specimens ... would help the employer
discover drug use and other useful information about employees.
There is no doubt about it-searches and seizures can yield a wealth
of information useful to the searcher. (That is why King George III's
men so frequently searched the colonists.) That potential, however,
does not make a[n] . . . employer's search of an employee a constitutionally reasonable one.
If Petitioner's actions in this instance were sanctioned the privacy rights of every employee, present and future, would be eviscerated. This case concerns the limits of an employer's power to inquire
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into and keep close watch over the details of its employees' personal
lives. Petitioner's inability to discern the proper limits is evidenced
by initiation of an HIV test without notice or consent (R. 2). The
lack of restraint and sensitivity displayed by Petitioner portrays a
cavalier disregard for an ordinary citizen's right of privacy and indicates that he considered such rights of no particular importance.
Petitioner has adequate alternatives through employee education. AIDS anxiety and concerns about AIDS in the workplace can
be effectively combatted through seminars, lectures and distribution
of medical literature. Education is certainly less costly than annual
imposition of HIV tests. Even more importantly, these alternatives
do no encroach upon employees' privacy rights.
Petitioner should not be able to administer an HIV test for the
AIDS antibody absent notice and consent. Moreover, Petitioner
should not be allowed to administer an HIV test without a bona fide
occupational justification. If Petitioner has any legitimate business
interest at all for imposing such a test, this interest is outweighed by
the administration of the test without notice and consent. The Marshall Appellate Court correctly held that Mr. Slater's right of privacy was intruded upon when Petitioner tested his blood for the
AIDS antibody without obtaining his consent. For these reasons affirmance of the Marshall Appellate Court is mandated.
II.

PETITIONER INVADED MR. SLATER'S PRIVACY WHEN
HE INDISCRIMINATELY REVEALED MR. SLATER'S PRIVATE MEDICAL INFORMATION TO UNRELATED
THIRD PARTIES WHO HAD NO LEGITIMATE NEED FOR
THE INFORMATION.

The right of privacy necessarily includes the right of the individual to have information concerning his health matters kept private without disclosure. Due to the stigmatized nature of AIDS and
the population it affects, medical information concerning AIDS is
considered a private health matter. Cronan v. New England Telephone, 1 Individual Empl. Rts. Cases (BNA) 658 (April 11, 1986).
The need to protect the identity of those individuals positively diagnosed as having the AIDS antibody, AIDS Related Complex [hereinafter "ARC"], or AIDS is paramount. Several states have enacted
statutes prohibiting unauthorized public disclosures of names or test
results of persons submitted to the HIV test. (See Appendix K).
However, the privacy interests of those diagnosed as having AIDS,
ARC, or the presence of the AIDS antibody can be more readily and
expeditiously protected by the application of common law.
The states are nearly unanimous in recognizing a common law
cause of action for invasion of privacy for publicity given to private
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facts. The State of Marshall has joined the majority of states in recognizing the tort as defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which provides that:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if
the matter publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977).
Most jurisdictions recognize four elements controlling the existence of a claim for violation of one's right to be free of publicity
regarding private matters: (1) publicity, given to (2) private facts,
(3) which would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and (4) is
not of legitimate concern to the public. Wells v. Thomas, 569 F.
Supp. 426 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 154
Cal. App. 3d 1040, 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1984). The Marshall Appellate Court correctly held that the application of the undisputed facts
to the elements of the tort entitled Mr. Slater to relief. Its decision
must be affirmed.
A.

MR. SLATER'S BLOOD SAMPLE AND THE UNWARRANTED TEST RESULTS DERIVED THEREFROM CONSTITUTE PRIVATE FACTS WHICH MR. SLATER REASONABLY EXPECTED TO BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL.

A private fact is one that has not already become public or left
open to the public. Harris v. Easton Publishing Co., 335 Pa. Super.
141, 483 A.2d 1377 (1984). The private fact or privacy interest involved in the tort of publicity is the information generated from the
blood sample rather than the blood test. The fact that Mr. Slater
had tested positive to the AIDS antibody test was a private fact not
already public nor left open to the public eye. See Huskey v. National Broadcasting Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Killilea
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 27 Ohio App. 3d 163, 499 N.E.2d 1291
(1985).
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), the
Court left open the question of liability for publicity torts where the
disclosed information is not a matter of public record. The sole exception to liability expressed by the Court was for truthful information contained in open public records within the purview of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 495. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374 (1967), the Court recognized the possibility of tort liability
for unwarranted publicity of the truth when it stated, "revelations
may be so intimate and so unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage the community's notion of decency." Id. at 383 n.7
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(citing Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2nd Cir.), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940)).
A clear majority of courts recognize that a person's private medical information constitutes a private fact. See e.g., Levias v. United
Airlines, 27 Ohio App. 3d 222, 500 N.E.2d 370 (1985). A cause of
action for disclosure of private facts will survive despite First
Amendment mandates. See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d
245 (9th Cir. 1971). In Division of Medical Quality, Bd. of Medical
Quality Assurance v. Gherardini,93 Cal. App. 3d 669, 678, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 55, 64 (1979), the court states that "a person's medical profile
is an area of privacy infinitely more intimate, more personal in quality and nature than many areas already judicially recognized and
protected." Publication of Mr. Slater's "medical profile" is precisely
the issue herein.
In Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580 (D.C.
App. 1985), the court held that a cause of action existed where a
plastic surgeon and department store used before and after photographs of a patient's cosmetic surgery without her consent. Concerning the privacy of the facts involved the court stated that,
"[c]ertainly if there is any right of privacy at all, it should include
the right to obtain medical treatment at home or in a hospital for an
individual personal condition. . . without personal publicity." Id. at
588 (quoting Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 1206, 159 S.W.2d
291, 295 (1942)).
It is clear from the record that both parties believed the contents of employee medical records were private information. The
record indicates that all employee medical files were guarded as confidential (R. 2). Petitioner's own policies were predicated on the privacy of these records. Petitioner violated his own company policy by
divulging private information. This court must not protect such behavior by cloaking personnel files of a private company with the
benefits of public document garb.
B. PETITIONER'S DISCLOSURE OF MR. SLATER'S PERSONAL MEDICAL INFORMATION TO UNRELATED
THIRD PARTIES CONSTITUTED PUBLICITY OF A PRIVATE FACT WHICH A REASONABLE PERSON WOULD
FIND OFFENSIVE.
The uncontested facts establish that there was an unreasonable
and offensive publicity of a private fact concerning Mr. Slater. Publicity requires that information be made public by a communication
to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be
regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.
Tureen v. Equifax, Inc., 571 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1978); Brown v. Mul-
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larkey, 632 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). Where a communication involving a private fact reaches, or is sure to reach, the public,
then publicity has been given to a party's private life. Wells v.
Thomas, 569 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
There is no specific requirement as to the number of persons to
which a private fact must be communicated before it is deemed publicized. The essence is that there be a communication to a body of
persons substantial enough in the overall context so as to assure a
degree of public knowledge. A publication to only seventeen persons
meets the publicity requirement. Harris v. Easton Publishing Co.,
335 Pa. Super. 141, 483 A.2d 1377 (1984).
In Harris,suit was brought for invasion of privacy after the defendant newspaper publicized facts concerning the private lives of a
welfare applicant and her family. The court found that even though
the newspaper did not specifically name the complainant in the article, at least seventeen people were able to identify her and her family. The court found publicity as a matter of law. Id. at 1385-86.
Similarly, in Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d
580 (D.C. App. 1985), the court sustained an invasion of privacy on
analogous principles. In holding that a publication had occurred the
court stated, "the nature of the publicity ensured that it would
reach the public . . . [and] that the fact that Mrs. Vassiliades
presented only two witnesses who learned of her plastic surgery...
does not defeat her claim." Id. at 588. The release of Mr. Slater's
personal medical information to pillars of the business community
easily satisfies the audience requirement of publicity. Contra Vogel
v. W.T. Grant Co., 458 Pa. 124, 327 A.2d 133 (1974), where the
court's flawed analysis rejected publicity based on the relatively
small number of recipients.
Additionally, the matter publicized must be of the kind that
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977). When applying this standard, the protection afforded to privacy interests must be related to the customs
of the time and place, to the occupation of the plaintiff and the habits of his neighbors and fellow citizens. Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 652D comment c (1977). The element of offensiveness is satisfied when the publicity given is such that a reasonable person
would feel justified in feeling seriously aggrieved by it. As one court
noted:
Men fear exposure not only to those closest to them; much of the outrage underlying the asserted right to privacy is a reaction to exposure
to persons known only through business or other secondary relationships. The claim is not so much one of total secrecy as it is of the right
to define one's circle of intimacy ...
Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 534, 483 P.2d
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34, 37, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 869 (1971) (emphasis in original).
Within the context of Mr. Slater's second cause of action, that
of publicity given to private facts, Petitioner's act of disclosing Mr.
Slater's positive test results at a Chamber of Commerce luncheon is
equally or more offensive than the initial act of obtaining the information. Mr. Slater's private medical information and interests, relative to the customs of time and place, deserve protection. Society's
extreme fear of AIDS, and the stigmatization and ostracism logically
flowing from Petitioner's disclosure, have certainly caused mental
suffering, shame, and humiliation to Mr. Slater.
The offensiveness of Petitioner's disclosure is further compounded by society's ignorance regarding the transmissibility of the
disease. "[T]he kind of nonsexual person-to-person contact that
generally occurs among workers and clients or consumers in the
workplace does not pose a risk for transmission of HTLV-III/LAV."
CDC Report at 694. This fact is largely unknown or ignored by the
public.
The facts establish that Petitioner, while attending a Chamber
of Commerce luncheon, disclosed Mr. Slater's private medical information in a way which insured that his communication would extend beyond the immediate forum of discussion. Petitioner advised
an entire table of colleagues, among the more than seventy-five persons attending, that he had tested his employees for the AIDS antibody and that Mr. Slater had tested positive (R. 3, Appendix 1).
The character of these people, as both business and community
leaders, and the overall excitement generated by the AIDS epidemic,
guarantees that Mr. Slater's name and his private medical profile
will be swiftly disclosed throughout the community.
Imposition of this indignity must not be countenanced. This
court must not allow this offensive disclosure to trample Mr. Slater's
privacy rights. The decision of the Marshall Appellate Court must
be affirmed.
C.

PETITIONER'S COMMUNICATION WAS NOT CONDITIONALLY PRIVILEGED BECAUSE IT DID NOT CONTAIN INFORMATION OF PUBLIC CONCERN.

The State of Marshall recognizes some form of conditional or
qualified privilege defense to public disclosure invasions of privacy
(R. 6). No such defense is available to Petitioner. The concept of
conditional privilege emerged from the related field of defamation,
and has been extended to disclosure of private fact torts by a small
number of courts. See, e.g., Knecht v. Vandalia Medical Center,
Inc., 14 Ohio App. 3d 129, 470 N.E.2d 230 (1984); Senogles v. Security Benefit Life Ins. Co., 217 Kan. 438, 536 P.2d 1358 (1975). Gener-
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ally, the conditional privilege defense allows an individual to escape
tort liability for disclosing facts about another's private life when
the statement published affects the legitimate interests of the publisher or a third person.
Most jurisdictions recognize that an action for disclosure of private facts must be based on information other than that which the
public ahs an interest in having made available. Virgil v. Time, Inc.,
527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976). The
presence of a public interest is the foundation for any conditional
privilege. Bichler v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 745 F.2d 1006 (6th
Cir. 1984). The Restatement recognizes a conditional privilege where
the disclosing party reasonably believes that there is a sufficient
public interest involved, and where the disclosure is made to a public officer or private citizen authorized to take action. Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 598 (1977). The public must possess a legitimate
interest in the contents of the information in order for Petitioner to
avoid disclosure liability. McCabe v. Village Voice, Inc., 550 F.
Supp. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1982). The facts of the case at bar fail to establish that a public interest exists.
A number of courts and commentators have resolved publicity
questions by application of a "newsworthiness" or "public interest"
standard. Beresky v. Teschner, 64 Ill. App. 3d 848, 381 N.E.2d 979
(1978). See also Comment, Privacy: The Search for a Standard, 11
Wake Forest L. Rev. 659 (1975).
A "public interest" privilege has been extended to newspapers
and broadcasters in reporting of matters of public concern. See Pierson v. News Group Publications, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 635 (S.D. Ga.
1982); Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70 (W. Va.
1984). However, even newspapers and broadcasters, who generally
receive relaxed applications of limiting rules, may invade upon interests so private that any public interest must yield. This is true,
even in light of First Amendment considerations. See Dietemann v.
Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
The privilege to publicize matters of legitimate public interest
is not absolute. Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., 665 F.2d 305, 307
(10th Cir. 1981). Certain private facts about a person should never
be publicized. Even facts concerning matters which are, or relate to
legitimate public interests, may not be publicized under all circumstances. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976). Names of persons involved in reported events are generally beyond the purview of public interest
unless the persons are public figures or persons who have otherwise
become legitimate targets of public interest. Hall v. Post, 85 N.C.
App. 610, 355 S.E.2d 819 (1987).
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In Hall, the court stated that "there are private matters so intimate or personal that the obvious bounds of propriety and decency
require their protection from public scrutiny in the absence of any
compelling justification for their revelation." Id. at 825. The instant
case presents no compelling justification for disclosure nor any allegation that Mr. Slater was a public figure. Private medical information concerning Mr. Slater did not constitute a legitimate public
interest.
The CDC Report indicates that the infecting agent in AIDS is
transmitted through sexual conduct, intravenous drug use, infected
blood or blood components, and by transmission from mother to
neonate. Epidemiological evidence has implicated only blood and semen in transmission. The virus has also been isolated from saliva,
tears, and urine, but extensive studies of non-sexual or "casual contact" situations in households and workplace have not indicated
transmission by this route. CDC Report at 682.
With the medical community in unanimous agreement that the
AIDS virus is not transmitted through casual contact, there was no
reason to advise local businessmen of the fact that one individual
tested positive. The identify of the individual was beyond the pale
of any imaginable need. Non-existent public interests can not be allowed to condone Petitioner's outrageous conduct. No conditional
privilege exists to insulate Petitioner from liability.
D.

NO CONDITIONAL PRIVILEGE EXISTS TO EXEMPT PETITIONER FROM LIABILITY BECAUSE NO LEGITIMATE OCCUPATIONAL OR PRIVATE INTEREST REQUIRED MR. SLATER'S PRIVATE
MEDICAL
INFORMATION TO BE DISCLOSED.

1. No private or occupational conditional privilege excuses Petitioner's wrongful release of sensitive private information.
Where a disclosure is outside of the scope of public interest, a
speaker will only be protected by privilege if the disclosed information protects the legitimate interests of the speaker or a related
third party. See Knecht v. Vandalia Medical Center, Inc., 14 Ohio
App. 3d 129, 470 N.E.2d 230 (1984). Petitioner's disclosure was
outside the scope of any privilege and is unprotected.
Under the Restatement, three relevant privileges must be explored. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 594-596 (1977). The pivotal point regarding these conditional privileges is that either the
speaker, the recipient, or some combination thereof must have a legitimate interest in the information disclosed. In addition, the recip-
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ient must be someone who the speaker may reasonably expect to be
able to act upon the information lawfully or be one entitled to the
information. See Klump v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarkets,
Inc., 376 So. 2d 514 (La. Ct. App. 1979), writ denied, 378 So. 2d
1391 (La. 1980). The instant case establishes a legitimate interest
only in Mr. Slater, not in Petitioner, the Chamber of Commerce, or
in the public at large. By the time Petitioner received Mr. Slater's
test results, Petitioner no longer had any legitimate interest in their
contents, because Slater had already left the company's employ (R.
3). Any prior incidental contact that Slater may have had with fellow employees is irrelevant in light of the Center of Disease Control's findings that casual workplace contact is not a vehicle for
transmissibility for the virus. CDC Report at 681. As health and
safety are not implicated, Petitioner can not logically assert employee health and safety as a creator of his interest. Petitioner's disclosure of Mr. Slater's test results were beyond the scope of either
his interest or any privilege.
In Bratt v. InternationalBusiness Machs. Corp., 785 F.2d 352
(1st Cir. 1984), the court found a limited intracorporate disclosure
actionable under a state privacy statute after an IBM employee, at
his supervisor's suggestion, consulted a doctor retained by the company. The doctor informed the company that the employee was
paranoid and should immediately consult a psychiatrist. When company employees learned of the doctor's conclusion, a publication occurred and an actionable disclosure of private facts existed. The
court noted that a disclosure is not actionable under the privacy
statute if "the employers legitimate business interest in obtaining
and publishing the information [outweighs] . . . the substantiality
of the intrusion on the privacy resulting from disclosure." Id. at 358
(quoting Bratt v. InternationalBusiness Machs. Corp., 392 Mass.
508, 517, 467 N.E.2d 126, 135 (1984). The court recognized that a
legitimate business interest could consist of an employer's "substantial and valid interest in aspects of employee health that could affect
the employee's ability to effectively perform job duties." Id. at 361
(quoting Bratt, 392 Mass. at 519). Accord Cronan v. New England
Telephone Co., 1 Individual Empl. Rts. Cases (BNA) 658 (April 11,
1986). A similar balancing analysis led the Marshall Appellate Court
to determine that Petitioner had not presented an outweighing
interest.
Where a disclosure does not act to protect legitimate personal
interests, a communication is privileged only if necessary to protect
the recipient's or other third parties interests. Knecht v. Vandalia
Medical Center, Inc., 14 Ohio App. 3d 129, 470 N.E.2d 230 (1984).
Where a recipient has a legitimate interest in the information and is
legally entitled to obtain the information or is a person to whom its
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publication is otherwise within generally accepted standards of conduct, a conditional privilege will exist. Bichler v. Union Bank &
Trust Co., 745 F.2d 1006 (6th Cir. 1984).
Petitioner did not offer information which "affects a sufficiently
important interest" of the businessmen seated at his table, nor did
the personal information concerning Mr. Slater affect any interest of
the seventy-five businessmen attending the luncheon. The record is
barren of any suggestion that any of the businessmen seated at Petitioner's table were sexual partners of Mr. Slater. Nor does the record suggest that any of these persons were a part of the relevant
medical community that would be entitled to notice for health care
reasons. Petitioner cannot escape liability by cloaking his actions in
a justification predicated upon the recipient's interests.
The facts of this action make clear that any expansion of the
conditional privilege through the concept of "commonality of interests," as expressed in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 596 comment
c (1977), is improper. The commonality rule enables individuals to
gain knowledge from associates where there is a common interest
between them even though the information gained may not advance
the objectives of that interest. Rogers v. International Business
Machs. Corp., 500 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Creps v. Waltz, 5
Ohio App. 3d 213, 450 N.E.2d 716 (1982). To be applicable, a common interest must be ascertainable. The generalized business interests of those who are members of the Chamber of Commerce fall far
short of any such common interest.
In Knecht v. Vandalia Medical Center, Inc., 14 Ohio App. 3d
129, 470 N.E.2d 230 (1984), the court applied the conditional privilege defense to allow a medical secretary to divulge a patient's venereal disease. The disclosure was to her own son who she reasonably
believed to be having relations with the patient. In explaining the
"common interest" privilege, the court noted that " '[a] publication
is conditionally or qualifiedly privileged where circumstances exist,
or are reasonably believed by the defendant to exist, which cast on
him the duty of making a communication to a certain other person
to whom he makes such communication in the performance of such
duty . . .'" Id. at 232 (quoting West v. People's Banking & Trust
Co., 14 Ohio App. 2d 69, 72, 236 N.E.2d 679, 681 (1967).
A close relationship or concrete common interest is not present
in the instant case. The disclosure in question was not made to persons who had a "common interest" with Petitioner, but to completely unrelated individuals. The only bond that Petitioner had
with the other luncheon guests is the fact that they were businessmen in the same community. Were this a sufficient nexus the exception would be broader than the rule. Any asserted common interests
of the parties involved is illusory and not deserving of conditional
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privilege protection. Petitioner's conduct is indefensible under the
conditional privilege exception.
2.

Petitioner's outrageous disclosure was an abuse of any conditional privilege.

Even if this court should determine that a conditional privilege
is available to Petitioner, the Marshall Appellate Court's decision
must nevertheless be affirmed because Petitioner abused this privilege. One is not permitted to avail oneself of the privilege if it is
abused. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 598 comment a (1977).
Abuse occurs whenever (1) the disclosure is not made to protect the
privileged interest; or (2) there is excessive publication; or (3) the
recipients 'are unrelated and lack a need for the information. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 603-605 (1977). Petitioner violated
these sections by releasing Mr. Slater's name and private medical
information to his business colleagues. The Marshall Appellate
Court correctly found that Petitioner abused the privilege by disclosing information to persons who had no need to know (R. 6).
In Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942),
the court faced a similar question where the media had invaded the
plaintiff's right to privacy by publishing certain photographs. In upholding a verdict for the plaintiff, the court stated "[w]hile plaintiff's ailment may have been a matter of some public interest because unusual, certainly the identity of the person who suffered the
ailment was not." Id. at 1206. Similarly, though there is a general
and legitimate public interest in AIDS it does not extend to Mr.
Slater's identity. Petitioner released Mr. Slater's identity more for
its conversational value than for any legitimate informational purpose. The release of this information by Petitioner crossed the line
of decency, and resulted in abuse of any purported privilege.
Furthermore, in Bratt v. InternationalBusiness Machs. Corp.,
785 F.2d 352 (1st, Cir. 1984), the court pointed out that where a
company establishes that certain information is private and sets up
rules to protect against the use of such information, the company
has imposed on itself a heavy burden of justification to warrant a
violation of its own rules. Id. at 361. Petitioner now seeks to escape
liability for violating its once confidential employee medical files
without adequate justification. Neither the factual nor medical data
presented provides any such justification. Such conduct is highly offensive to a reasonable person and can not be condoned.
Petitioner's actions also constituted excessive publication. Not
only did he disclose the AIDS information at his table, but the disclosure could have been overheard by, or repeated to, any one or
more of the seventy-five businessmen attending the luncheon. Publi-
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cation of such vital personal information to leaders of the business
community is highly prejudicial to Mr. Slater. The likelihood of his
being able to obtain employment in the area has been substantially
reduced if not eliminated. Where there is literally no reason to disclose to a single person, then it logically follows that disclosure to a
larger group must be deemed excessive.
The record fails to disclose the existence of any viable conditional privilege to support the publication by Petitioner of vital personal information concerning Mr. Slater. Assuming that such a conditional privilege can be located, it can not be allowed to protect
Petitioner as the nature of his use of that privilege was abusive. For
these reasons the decision of the Marshall Appellate Court for the
First Judicial Circuit must be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent respectfully requests this
court to affirm the decision of the Marshall Appellate Court for the
First Judicial Circuit reversing the decision of the district court and
ordering the district court to enter summary judgment in favor of
Respondent on the issue of liability and further ordering that trial
be held on the issue of damages.
Respectfully submitted,
Matthew W. Nakon
Laura J. Steffe
Steven R. Yoo
Counsel for Respondent
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APPENDIX A
NO. 9713
IN THE MARSHALL APPELLATE COURT
FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

)

JOHN SLATER,

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

)
) On Appeal From -the
) Lincoln County
) District Court

vs.
LAWRENCE A. WILSON d/b/a
SENTRY SERVICES,

)

) Honorable David Helms
) Judge Presiding
Defendant-Appellee. )
OPINION

MURRAY, Judge.
Plaintiff, John Slater, filed a two count complaint in Lincoln
County District Court against his former employer for taking and
disclosing the plaintiff's private physiological information. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. Judge Helms
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on both counts.
This appeal followed.

The following facts were stipulated by the parties. Sentry Services ("Sentry") is a private security guard and night watch service
operated as a sole proprietorship by its owner, Lawrence Wilson.
John Slater is a former employee of Sentry. Slater, hired by Sentry
in 1983, worked the night shift while pursuing a business degree at
the University of Marshall.
Sentry has about 140 employees and nearly thirty regular clients in Benton Bay, Lincoln County and three adjacent counties.
Sentry's employees generally work in eight hours shifts, with most of
the employee working in the evening or early morning hours.
To ascertain whether its employees are in adequate physical
condition, Sentry provides an annual physical testing program that
includes a blood test. In past years, as employees were informed,
blood was tested for cholesterol levels and hypoglycemia, a disorder
associated with diabetes. The test results were recorded in each em-
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ployee's personnel file. This medical information was always kept
confidential. Any employee with a cardiovascular or blood-sugar d6order was given a leave of absence until the company physician informed the employer that the employee could safely return to work.
Slater never objected to the company physical.
In December of 1986, the Lincoln Medical Laboratory, retained
by Sentry for purposes of its testing program, suggested that Sentry
include the HIV
Slater left the company on April 30, 1987 to complete his exams
and begin his search for employment related to his degree. On May
1, 1987, Wilson was informed by the laboratory that Slater tested
positive for the existence of the HIV antibody ("AIDS antibody").
Wilson contacted Slater that same day, informing him of the test
and the test results.
Subsequently, on May 6, 1987, Wilson attended the monthly
luncheon of the Lincoln County Chamber of Commerce held at a
local restaurant. During lunch, before the start of the business meeting, people at Wilson's table began discussing AIDS. Wilson informed his friends that he had tested his employees for the AIDS
antibody and that one, John Slater, had tested positive.
Slater's complaint, filed June 12, 1987, alleged that Wilson had
invaded Slater's privacy in two ways. First, Slater alleged that Wilson intruded on his seclusion when Slater was tested for the AIDS
antibody without his consent. Second, Slater alleged that Wilson invaded Slater's privacy when Wilson publicly disclosed the private
fact that Slater tested positive for the AIDS antibody. Slater and
Wilson filed cross motions for summary judgment. In support of his
motion, Slater submitted a copy of the Recommendation for
Preventing Transmission of Infection with Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus in the
Workplace prepared by the Center for Disease Control. Wilson submitted no evidence to contravene the report, but argued that the
report itself was irrelevant to the determination of the issues.
1. "Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) is the internationally recognized
name for the virus that is believed to cause AIDS. The virus has also been called LAV
(Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus type III) and HTLV-III (Human T-Lymphotropic Virus)." Schatz, The Aids Insurance Crisis: Underwriting or Overreaching?,
100 Harv. L. Rev. 1782 n. 3 (1987). The "HIV" test to determine the existence of the
antibody is comprised of a series of three tests, known as the ELISA-ELISA-Western
Blot series. "A person with two positive ELISA tests and a positive WB [Western
blot] is a true confirmed positive with 99.9% reliability." Clifford and luculano, AIDS
and Insurance: The Rationale for Aids-Related Testing, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1806,
1812 (1987).
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II.

INTRUSION INTO SECLUSION
The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on Count I of the plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that
disease information contained in Slater's blood did not constitute a
privacy interest protected by the tort of intrusion into seclusion. It
further stated that "even if the plaintiff proved a prima facie case of
invasion of privacy, this Court is not persuaded that the plaintiff's
privacy interest outweighs the employer's right to acquire the information." We disagree with the trial court in both respects.
Along with many other jurisdictions, the State of Marshall recognizes the tort of invasion of privacy. See Restatement (Second) of
Torts sec. 652A comment (a) (1977). The Restatement of Torts provides that "[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise,
upon the solitude or seclusion of another of his private affairs or
concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 652B (1977). Recovery
under this tort "requires proof of an actual invasion of 'something
secret, secluded or private pertaining to the plaintiff ...
' "Nelson
v. Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1223 (Me. 1977).
The issue with respect to this count is whether the private
physiological biography contained in the body fluids of an individual
can be a seclusion which the individual reasonably expects to be left
alone. In the few cases that have considered the matter, the courts
have generally concluded that "[o]ne clearly has a reasonable and
legitimate expectation of privacy in . . . personal information con-

tained in his body fluids." McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122,
1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985). Therefore, we hold that the physiological biography contained in the blood of an individual is private information which an individual can reasonably expect to be ft alone.
Having found that Slater's private physiological biography contained in the blood of an individual is private information which an
individual can reasonably expect to be left alone.
Having found that Slater's private physiological biography is a
matter entitled to seclusion, we need only find whether Sentry's actions amounted to an intrusion. An intrusion is an unpermitted entry by any means into the seclusion of another. Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 652B. We hold that Sentry intruded when it
intentionally tested Slater's blood for the AIDS antibody without
Slater's consent. Even if the employer had an interest in determining whether its employees had been exposed to the AIDS antibody,
its interests are not so great as to justify its administration of such
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tests without notice and consent. We therefore conclude that Sentry
invaded Slater's privacy when it tested Slater's blood for the AIDS
antibody without first obtaining his consent. The trial court's decision as to County I is accordingly reversed.
III.
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE FACTS
The trial court noted that the Center for Disease Control (CDC)
had found that AIDS is transmitted only through body fluids. Nonetheless, the court concluded that "because (1) AIDS is lethal; (2)
research into AIDS is, by virtue of its novelty, incomplete; and (3)
the public is terrified of infection regardless of the current evidence
as to the transmissibility of AIDS, the public's need to be informed
outweighs any privacy interest" that Slater may have. We disagree.
Individuals have the right to be free from public disclosure of
facts relating to private medical information. Levias v. United Airlines, 27 Ohio App.3d 222, 500 N.E.2d 370 (1985). While a narrow
privilege exists allowing disclosure of such information to one who
can show need, the privilege to disclose is abused when the disclosure is to persons who have no need to know the information. Id.
(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 605, 652G (1977)).
Admittedly, some individuals may have a legitimate interest in
knowing Slater's condition, but the publication here can hardly be
said to have been given to those in need of the information. Wilson
informed the general public of Slater's condition when he discussed
the test results at a business luncheon.
The CDC has stated that the HIV virus is "transmitted through
sexual contact, parenteral exposure to contaminated blood or blood
products, and perinatal transmission from infected mothers to their
offspring . . . . [It has not] been shown to be transmitted by casual
contact in the work place, contaminated food or water, or airborne
or fecal-oral routes." Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Infection with Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III/
Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus in the Workplace, 34 Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Rep. 682-83 (1985). Consequently, only
Slater's sexual partners or those people who are likely to have contact with Slater's blood can show a need for results of the HIV tests.
The public at large has no need. Moreover, none of the recipients of
the information was Slater's sexual partner or likely to be exposed
to Slater's blood. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial
court as to Count II the plaintiff's complaint.
As a matter of law, based on the stipulated facts, we find that
defendant's actions constituted an intrusion into seclusion and a
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public disclosure of private facts. It is therefore ordered that the
District Court enter summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on
the issue of liability. It is further ordered that trial be held on the
issue of damages.
Judges Washington and West concur.
This memorandum may be cited as Appendix 1 of the Record.
1. How is anonymity assured given the requirement that the
names of the participating school and individual participants
must appear on the measuring brief and five duplicate copies?
- Upon receipt, each brief is given a confidential identification
number. The Competition Committee cuts out the names of
the schools and team members with a scissors before submitting the briefs to the brief graders. The identification code is
kept in a secure file under the control of the committee.
2. Can a student, who has an undergraduate law degree from England but is not eligible to take the bar exam in either the
United States or England, participate as a member of a team.
- Yes
3. Does use of computerized citation and spelling checking violate
the rules on assistance?
-No
4. Must participating schools brief and argue the issue of
damages?
-No
5. Is Mr. Slater still alive?
-Yes
6. According to the Benton fact pattern, Mr. Slater never objected to the company physical; however I would like to know if
Slater ever signed any type of a medical release form.
-No
7. How many people attended the Lincoln County Chamber of
Commerce luncheon?
- In excess of 75 people
8. How many people were seated at Mr. Wilson's table who were
informed of Mr. Slater's rest results?
- The record is silent
9. Did these people know Mr. Slater or have any reason to come
into contact with Mr. Slater?
- The record is silent
10. What was Mr. Slater's reaction to the news that he tested
positive?
- The record is silent
11. Was there any outrage at the fact that he was tested?
- The record is silent
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Were any other employees notified of the testing after the fact?
- The record is silent
Does the court have knowledge of any response of any other
employee over the testing?
-No
The Record on Appeal states that trial will be held on the issue
of damages. Does this mean that no evidence as to lost job opportunities, lost companionship, actual harm to his reputation,
either socially or professionally, or other form of damage was
presented in to the lower courts?
- See the Record.
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APPENDIX B
NO. 87-1314
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF MARSHALL
LAWRENCE A. WILSON, d/b/a
SENTRY SERVICES,
Petitioner,
versus
JOHN SLATER,
Respondent.

ORDER
The Supreme Court of the State of Marshall hereby grants petitioner, Lawrence A. Wilson d/b/a Sentry Services, leave to appeal.
The parties shall address all issues raised in the opinion of the Marshall Appellate Court.

David J. Bosworth
Chief Justice
Dated: July 17, 1987
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APPENDIX C
AMENDMENT 1 [1791]
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
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APPENDIX D
Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 594.

Protection of the Publisher's Interest

An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if the
circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief that
(a) there is information that affects a sufficiently important interest
of the publisher, and
(b) the recipient's knowledge of the defamatory matter will be of
service in the lawful protection of the interest.

§ 595. Protection of Interest of Recipient or a Third Person
(1)

An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if the
circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief that
(a) There is information that affects a sufficiently important interest
of the recipient or a third person, and
(b) the recipient is one to whom the publisher is under a legal duty
to publish the defamatory matter or is a person to whom its publication is otherwise within the generally accepted standards of
decent conduct.

(2)

In determining whether a publication is within generally accepted standards of decent conduct it is an important factor
that
(a)

the publication is made in response to a request rather than
volunteered by the publisher or

(b) a family or other relationship exists between the parties.

§ 596. Common Interest
An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if the
circumstances lead any one of several persons having a common
interest in a particular subject matter correctly or reasonably to
believe that there is information that another sharing the common
interest is entitled to know.
§ 598

Communication to One Who May Act in the Public Interest

An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if the
circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief that
(a)

there is information that affects a sufficiently important public
interest, and

(b) the public interest requires the communication of the defamatory matter to a public officer or a private citizen who is authorized or privileged to take action if the defamatory matter is true.
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§ 603.

Purpose of the Privilege

One who upon an occasion giving rise to a conditional privilege
publishes defamatory matter concerning another abuses the privilege if he does not act for the purpose of protecting the interest
for the protection of which the privilege is given.
§ 604.

Excessive Publication

One who, upon an occasion giving rise to a conditional privilege
for the publication of defamatory matter to a particular person or
persons, knowingly publishes the matter to a person to whom its
publication is not otherwise privileged, abuses the privilege unless
he reasonably believes that the publication is a proper means of
communicating the defamatory matter to the person to whom its
publication is privileged.
§ 605.

Necessity for Publication and Purpose of Privilege

One who upon an occasion giving rise to a conditional privilege
publishes defamatory matter concerning another, abuses the privilege if he does not reasonably believe the matter to be necessary
to accomplish the purpose for which the privilege is given.
§ 652A.

General Principle

(1)

One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to
liability for the resulting harm to the interests of the other.

(2)

The right of privacy is invaded by
(a)

unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated
in § 652B; or
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness, as stated in §
652C; or
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life, as stated
in § 652D; or
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light
before the public, as stated in § 652E.
§ 652B.

Intrusion upon Seclusion

One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns,
is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
§ 652D.

Publicity Given to Private Life

One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his pri-
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vacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
Editor's note: Appendixes E-K are not included, but consisted of the
following material:
Appendix E: Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of
Infection with Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus in the Workplace, 34 Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Rep. 681 (1985)
Appendix F: Public Health Service Guidelines for Counseling
and Antibody Testing to Prevent HIV Infection and AIDS, 36 Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Rep. 509 (1987)
Appendix G: Weiss, Goedert, Sarngadharan, Bodner, Gallo &
Blattner, Screening Test for HTL V-III (AIDS Agent) Antibodies,
1986 J. A.M.A. 262
Appendix H: McCray, Occupational Risk of the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome among Health Care Workers, 314 New
Eng. J. Med. 1126 (1986)
Appendix I: Sande, Transmission of AIDS: The Care Against
Casual Contagion, 314 New Eng. J. Med. 380 (1986)
Appendix J: Friedland, Saltzman, Rogers, Kahl, Lesser, Mayers
& Klein, Lack of Transmission of HTLV-III/LAV Infection to
Household Contacts of Patients with AIDS or AIDS-Related Complex with Oral Candidiasis, 314 New Eng. J. Med. 344 (1986)
Appendix K: Selected State Statutes and City Ordinances
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